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Abstract—We consider the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair re-
generating code problem, which generalizes the (n, k, d) exact-
repair regenerating code problem with the additional constraint
that the stored file needs to be kept information-theoretically
secure against an eavesdropper, who can access the data trans-
mitted to regenerate a total of ` different failed nodes. For all
known results on this problem, the achievable tradeoff regions
between the normalized storage capacity and repair bandwidth
have a single corner point, achieved by a scheme proposed by
Shah, Rashmi and Kumar (the SRK point). Since the achievable
tradeoff regions of the exact-repair regenerating code problem
without any secrecy constraints are known to have multiple
corner points in general, these existing results suggest a phase-
change-like behavior, i.e., enforcing a secrecy constraint (` ≥ 1)
immediately reduces the tradeoff region to one with a single
corner point. In this work, we first show that when the secrecy
parameter ` is sufficiently large, the SRK point is indeed the only
corner point of the tradeoff region. However, when ` is small, we
show that the tradeoff region can in fact have multiple corner
points. In particular, we establish a precise characterization of
the tradeoff region for the (7, 6, 6, 1) problem, which has exactly
two corner points. Thus, a smooth transition, instead of a phase-
change-type of transition, should be expected as the secrecy
constraint is gradually strengthened.
Index Terms—Distributed storage, exact-repair regenerating
codes, information-theoretic security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault tolerance and node repair are two fundamental ingredi-
ents of reliable distributed storage systems. While the study of
fault tolerance via diversity coding has been in the literature for
decades [1]–[7], systematic studies of node repair mechanisms
were started only recently by Dimakis et al. in their pioneering
work [8]. A particular model, which has received a significant
amount of attention in the literature, is the so-called exact-
repair regenerating code problem.
More specifically, in an (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating
code problem, a file M of size B is to be encoded and
then stored in a total of n distributed storage nodes, each
of capacity α. The encoding needs to ensure that: 1) the
file M can be perfectly recovered by having full access to
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Fig. 1. The regions above the solid and the dashed lines are the achievable
normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff regions for the (4, 3, 3)
exact-repair regenerating code and the (4, 3, 3, 1) secure exact-repair regen-
erating code problems, respectively.
any k out of the total n storage nodes; 2) when a node
failure occurs, the failed node can be regenerated by extracting
data of size β from each of an arbitrary set of d remaining
nodes. An important technical contribution of [8] was to show
that there is an inherent tradeoff between the node capacity
α and the repair bandwidth β in satisfying both the file-
recovery and node-regeneration requirements. In particular, it
has been shown [9] that the achievable normalized storage-
capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region for any (n, k, d)
exact-repair regenerating code problem with k > 1 features
multiple corner points including the the all-important minimum
storage rate (MSR) and minimum bandwidth rate (MBR)
points. Fig. 1 illustrates the achievable normalized storage-
capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region for the (4, 3, 3)
exact-repair regenerating code problem, which features three
corner points including the MSR point (1/3, 1/3) and the
MBR point (1/2, 1/6). Despite intensive research efforts that
have yielded many highly non-trivial partial results [8]–[11],
the optimal tradeoffs between the node capacity α and repair
bandwidth β have not been fully understood for the general
(n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem.
In this paper, we consider an extension of the afore-
mentioned exact-repair regenerating code problem, which
further requires certain security guarantee during the node-
regeneration processes. More specifically, the (n, k, d, `) se-
cure exact-repair regenerating code problem that we consider
is the standard (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code prob-
lem [8]–[11], with the additional constraint that the file M
needs to be kept information-theoretically secure against an
eavesdropper that can access the data extracted to regenerate a
total of ` different failed nodes (possibly under different repair
groups). Apparently, this is only possible when ` < k. Fur-
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2thermore, when ` = 0, the secrecy constraint degenerates, and
the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem
reduces to the (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem
without any security constraints.
Under the additional secrecy constraint (` ≥ 1), the optimal
tradeoffs between the node capacity α and repair bandwidth β
have been studied in [12]–[15]. In particular, Shah, Rashmi and
Kumar [13] showed that a particular tradeoff point (referred
to as the SRK point) can be obtained by extending an MBR
code based on the product-matrix construction proposed in
[9]. Later, it was shown that the SRK point is the only corner
point of the tradeoff region for the cases where we have
either d = 2, 3 [14], or d = 4 [15], or k = 2 [14], or
` = k−1 = d−1 [14]. This is in sharp contrast to the original
exact-repair regenerating code problem [8]–[11] without any
secrecy constraints, for which, as mentioned previously, the
tradeoff region features multiple corner points when k > 1.
Fig. 1 also illustrates the tradeoff region for the (4, 3, 3, 1)
secure exact-repair regenerating code problem, which features
a single corner point at (1, 1/3). Thus, the existing results
from [14], [15] seem to suggest a phase-change-like behavior
that enforcing a secrecy constraint immediately reduces the
tradeoff region from one with multiple corner points (` = 0)
to one with a single corner point (` ≥ 1).
The main results of this paper are two-folded.
• We first show, via new converse results, that for any
given (k, d) pair, there is a lower bound on `, denoted by
`∗(k, d), such that when ` ≥ `∗(k, d), the SRK point is
indeed the only conner point of the tradeoff region for the
(n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem.
As we shall see, the lower bound `∗(k, d) ≤ k−1 for any
(k, d) pair, and thus the tradeoff region for any (n, k, d, `)
problem with ` = k−1 or k = 2 must have a single corner
point. In addition, the lower bound `∗(k, d) = 1 for any
d ∈ [2 : 4]. Therefore, our result includes all previous
results from [14] and [15] as special cases.
• Next, we show that when 1 ≤ ` < `∗(k, d), it is entirely
possible that the tradeoff region features multiple corner
points. In particular, we establish a precise characteriza-
tion of the tradeoff region for the (7, 6, 6, 1) problem,
which has exactly two corner points (see Fig. 2 for an
illustration). This result requires new achievability results
as well as new converse results, the former of which
are obtained by extending the layered coding scheme
proposed in [16]. From the viewpoint of the rate region,
our result suggests that a smooth transition, instead of a
phase-change-type of transition, should be expected as the
secrecy constraint is gradually strengthened by increasing
the parameter `.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND KNOWN RESULTS
Let (n, k, d,N,K, T, S) be a tuple of positive integers such
that n ≥ d+1 ≥ k+1 ≥ 2. Formally, an (n, k, d,N,K, T, S)
code consists of:
• for each i ∈ [1 : n], a message-encoding function fi : [1 :
N ]× [1 : K]→ [1 : T ];
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Fig. 2. The regions above the solid line is the achievable normalized storage-
capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region for the (7, 6, 6, 1) secure exact-
repair regenerating code problem. In addition to the SRK point (2/15, 1/5),
the tradeoff region has another corner point at (3/8, 1/8).
• for each A ⊆ [1 : n] such that |A| = k, a message-
decoding function gA : [1 : T ]k → [1 : N ];
• for each B ⊆ [1 : n] such that |B| = d, i ∈ B, and
j ∈ [1 : n] \ B, a repair-encoding function fBi→j : [1 :
T ]→ [1 : S];
• for each B ⊆ [1 : n] such that |B| = d and j ∈ [1 : n]\B,
a repair-decoding function gBj : [1 : S]
d → [1 : T ].
Let M be a message that is uniformly distributed over [1 :
N ], and K be a secret key that is uniformly distributed over
[1 : K]. The message M and the secret key K are assumed
to be independent of each other. For each i ∈ [1 : n], let
Wi = fi(M,K) be the data stored at the ith storage node,
and for each B ⊆ [1 : n] such that |B| = d, i ∈ B, and
j ∈ [1 : n] \ B, let SBi→j = fBi→j(Wi) be the data extracted
from the ith storage node in order to regenerate the data stored
at the jth storage node under the context of repair group B.
Obviously,
B = logN, α = log T, β = logS
represent the message rate, storage capacity, and repair band-
width, respectively.
A normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pair (α¯, β¯)
is said to be achievable for the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair
regenerating code problem if an (n, k, d,N,K, T, S) code can
be found such that:
• (rate normalization)
α/B = α¯ and β/B = β¯; (1)
• (message recovery)
M = gA(Wi : i ∈ A) (2)
for any A ⊆ [1 : n] such that |A| = k;
• (node regeneration)
Wj = g
B
j (S
B
i→j : i ∈ B) (3)
for any B ⊆ [1 : n] such that |B| = d and j ∈ [1 : n] \B;
• (repair secrecy)
I(M; (S→j : j ∈ E)) = 0 (4)
for any E ⊆ [1 : n] such that |E| = `, where S→j :=
3(SBi→j : B ⊆ [1 : n], |B| = d, B 63 j, i ∈ B) is the
collection of data that can be extracted from the other
nodes to regenerate node j.
The closure of all achievable (α¯, β¯) pairs is the achievable
normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region
Rn,k,d,` for the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating
code problem.
In [13], Shah, Rashmi and Kumar proved the following
important achievability result for the general (n, k, d, `) secure
regenerating code problem:(
dT−1k,d,`,, T
−1
k,d,`
)
∈ Rn,k,d,` (5)
where
Tk,d,` :=
k∑
i=`+1
(d+ 1− i). (6)
Note that when ` = 0 (no repair-secrecy constraint),(
dT−1k,d,0, T
−1
k,d,0
)
recovers the MBR point of the (n, k, d)
exact-repair regenerating code problem [9]. It has been shown
that the SRK point (5) is the only corner point of the tradeoff
region Rn,k,d,` for the cases where we have either d = 2, 3
[14], or d = 4 [15], or k = 2 [14], or ` = k− 1 = d− 1 [14].
III. NEW RESULTS
Consider the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating
code problem (with ` ≥ 1), and let
`∗(k, d) := min
{
` ≥ 1 : Tk,d,` ≤ d+
√
d`
}
. (7)
Note that Tk,d,` is monotone non-increasing with respect to `
for any given (k, d) pair, so we have
Tk,d,` ≤ d+
√
d`, ∀` ≥ `∗(k, d). (8)
We have the following two outer bounds for the tradeoff region
Rn,k,d,`.
Theorem 1. For the general (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair re-
generating code problem, any achievable normalized storage-
capacity repair-bandwidth pair (α¯, β¯) ∈ Rn,k,d,` must satisfy:
β¯ ≥ T−1k,d,`. (9)
In addition, when ` ≥ `∗(k, d), any achievable normalized
storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pair (α¯, β¯) ∈ Rn,k,d,` must
also satisfy:
α¯ ≥ dT−1k,d,`. (10)
(Conversely, any (α¯, β¯) satisfying (9) and (10) is achievable.)
While the proof of (9) is straightforward, the proof of (10)
is long and technical. We shall defer the proof to Section V.
Combining (9) and (10) proves that the SRK point (5) is the
only corner point of the tradeoff region Rn,k,d,` when ` ≥
`∗(k, d). It is straightforward to verify that the lower bound
`∗(k, d) ≤ k − 1 for any (k, d) pair and `∗(k, d) = 1 for
d ∈ [2 : 4]. Therefore, Theorem 1 includes all previous results
from [14] and [15] as special cases.
Next, we shift our attention to the cases where 1 ≤ ` <
`∗(k, d). To see how the tradeoff region Rn,k,d,` may look
like in this case, let us begin with the following achievability
results for the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-repair regenerating code
problem with k = d = n− 1.
Theorem 2. For any t ∈ [2 : n− `], we have
(α¯t, β¯t) ∈ Rn,n−1,n−1,` (11)
where
(t− 1)α¯t = (n− 1)β¯t :=
(
n− 1
t− 1
)/(
n− `
t
)
. (12)
The proof is based on a new coding scheme, which we shall
describe in the next section. Note that when ` = 1, (α¯t, β¯t)
can be simplified as:
(α¯t, β¯t) =
(
t
(t− 1)(n− t) ,
t
(n− 1)(n− t)
)
. (13)
In this case, when t = 2, (α¯t, β¯t) coincides with the SRK point
(5) with k = d = n− 1 and ` = 1. Furthermore, note that β¯t
is monotone increasing with t, and α¯t is monotone decreasing
with t for any t ∈ [2 : n − 1] such that t2 + t < n. Thus,
no pairs of points from the set {(α¯2, β¯2), . . . , (α¯t+1, β¯t+1)}
dominate each other for any t ∈ [2 : n − 1] such that
t2 + t < n. For example, when n = 7, a second achievability
point (α¯3, β¯3) =
(
3
8 ,
1
8
)
emerges in addition to the SKR
point (α¯2, β¯2) =
(
2
5 ,
1
15
)
. When n = 13, a third achievability
point (α¯4, β¯4) =
(
4
27 ,
1
27
)
emerges in addition to the points
(α¯3, β¯3) =
(
3
20 ,
1
40
)
and (α¯2, β¯2) =
(
2
11 ,
1
66
)
. Therefore, for
the (n, n − 1, n − 1, 1) secure exact-repair regenerating code
problem, the SRK point cannot be the only corner point when
n ≥ 7.
Next, we show that both (α¯2, β¯2) and (α¯3, β¯3) are optimal
tradeoff points for the (n, n− 1, n− 1, 1) secure exact-repair
regenerating code problem when n ≥ 7, so in this case the
tradeoff region must have multiple corner points.
Theorem 3. For the (n, n − 1, n − 1, 1) secure exact-repair
regenerating code problem with n ≥ 7, any achievable
normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pair (α¯, β¯) ∈
Rn,n−1,n−1,1 must satisfy:
nα¯+
(n− 1)(n− 6)
2
β¯ ≥ 3. (14)
Note that both
(α¯2, β¯2) =
(
2
n− 2 ,
2
(n− 1)(n− 2)
)
and (α¯3, β¯3) =
(
3
2(n− 3) ,
3
(n− 1)(n− 3)
)
satisfy the inequality (14) with equalities and hence cannot be
dominated by a single achievable tradeoff point.
Finally, we focus on the (n, n − 1, n − 1, 1) problem with
n = 7 and show that the tradeoff region has exactly two corner
points at (α¯2, β¯2) and (α¯3, β¯3).
Theorem 4. For the (7, 6, 6, 1) secure exact-repair regenerat-
ing code problem, any achievable normalized storage-capacity
repair-bandwidth pair (α¯, β¯) ∈ R7,6,6,1 must satisfy:
α¯ ≥ 3
8
. (15)
4Therefore, the tradeoff region R7,6,6,1 is given by:
R7,6,6,1 =
{
(α¯, β¯) : β¯ ≥ 1
15
, 7α¯+ 3β¯ ≥ 3, α¯ ≥ 3
8
}
. (16)
The proof of (14) and (15) can be found in Section V.
IV. A NEW (n, n− 1, n− 1, `) CODE CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we provide a code construction based on
the layered exact-repair regenerating codes proposed in [16],
which leads to the achievability of the tradeoff points given in
Theorem 2.
Fix a parameter t, and consider the following scheme. There
are a total of B =
(
n−`
t
)
(t− 1) information symbols, denoted
as M, and there are a total of R =
(
n
t
)
(t − 1) − B random
symbols, denoted as K. Assume that an eavesdropper has
access to the repair messages to an arbitrary set of ` nodes,
the collection of which is denoted as E.
We first encode the (R+B) =
(
n
t
)
(t−1) symbols (in a finite
field Fq such that q ≥ 2(R + B), and q will be used as the
basis of the entropy function), into the parity check symbols
of an (2(R+B), R+B) systematic MDS code. These R+B
symbols are broken into a total of
(
n
t
)
parity groups, each with
(t − 1) symbols, and each parity group is associated with a
subset A of [1 : n] of cardinality t.
Next, we expand each parity group by introducing one
additional parity symbol which can be the simple linear sum
of them, in the same finite field as earlier (or even in the binary
field, assuming the original one is an extension of the binary
field). These t symbols are then distributed into the subset of
nodes associated with this parity group, one symbol to each
node.
We need to show that the following three conditions are
satisfied:
1) Reconstruction with any n−1 nodes. This is trivial since
in each parity group, at most one of them is in the failed
node, and thus the contents of the parity group can be
recovered. This also implies that
αt =
(
n− 1
t− 1
)
. (17)
2) Repair with the remaining n− 1 nodes. Assume without
loss of generality that node 1 fails. Then, to repair the
symbol in the parity group associated with each A such
that 1 ∈ A and |A| = t, we can send from the remaining
nodes all the other symbols in this parity group. The total
transmission is thus given by:
(n− 1)βt = (t− 1)αt. (18)
3) Security against any eavesdropper on ` nodes. We need
to show that
I(M;E) = 0. (19)
This follows from
I(M;E) = H(E)−H(E|M)
= H(E)−H(E|M) +H(E|M,K)
= H(E)− I(E;K|M)
= H(E)−H(K|M) +H(K|M,E)
= H(E)−R+H(K|M,E).
All the parity groups that have symbols in the compro-
mised nodes are completely revealed by accessing E, and
conversely all the symbols in E can be generated by these
parity groups alone. A total of
(
n
t
)− (n−`t ) parity groups
are exposed, implying that
H(E) ≤ R.
It only remains to show that
H(K|M,E) = 0. (20)
which follows from the fact that given the eavesdropper’s
information and the message M, the random symbols K
can be completely recovered. This can be seen as follows:
there are a total of R symbols (after removing the simple
sums in each parity group) from E that were original
parity symbols of the (2(R+B), R+B) MDS code, but
any R + B codeword symbols can be used to recover
the original information (M,R), which we indeed have
together with the B information symbols.
Normalizing αt and βt by B proves the achievability of the
tradeoff points given in Theorem 2.
V. PROOF OF THE CONVERSE RESULTS
A. Proof of (9) and (10)
Let us first outline the main ingredients for proving the
inequalities (9) and (10).
1) Total number of nodes. To prove the inequalities (9)
and (10), let us first note that these two inequalities are
independent of the total number of storage nodes n in
the system. In our proof, we only need to consider the
cases where n = d+ 1. For the cases where n > d+ 1,
since any subsystem consisting of d + 1 out of the total
n storage nodes must give rise to a (d+ 1, k, d, `) secure
exact-repair regenerating code problem. Therefore, these
two inequalities as outer bounds must apply as well.
When n = d + 1, any repair group B of size d is
uniquely determined by the node j to be repaired, i.e.,
B = [1 : n] \ {j}, and hence can be dropped from the
notation SBi→j without causing any confusion.
2) Code symmetry. Due to the built-in symmetry of the
problem, to prove the inequalities (9) and (10), we only
need to consider the so-called symmetrical codes [10] for
which the joint entropy of any subset of random variables
from
(M,K, (Wi : i ∈ [1 : n]), (Si→j : i, j ∈ [1 : n], i 6= j))
remains unchanged under any permutation over the
storage-node indices.
3) Key collections of random variables. Focusing on the
symmetrical (n = d + 1, d,N,K, T, S) codes, the fol-
lowing collections of random variables play a key role in
our proof:
WA := (Wi : i ∈ A) , A ⊆ [1 : n] (21)
5W1 S2→1 S3→1 S4→1
W2
W3
W4
S1→2 S3→2 S4→2
S1→3 S2→3 S4→3
S1→4 S2→4 S3→4
W5S1→5 S2→5 S3→5 S4→5
S5→1
S5→2
S5→3
S5→4
W1 S2→1 S3→1 S4→1
W2
W3
W4
S1→2 S3→2 S4→2
S1→3 S2→3 S4→3
S1→4 S2→4 S3→4
W5S1→5 S2→5 S3→5 S4→5
S5→1
S5→2
S5→3
S5→4
W1 S2→1 S3→1 S4→1
W2
W3
W4
S1→2 S3→2 S4→2
S1→3 S2→3 S4→3
S1→4 S2→4 S3→4
W5S1→5 S2→5 S3→5 S4→5
S5→1
S5→2
S5→3
S5→4
(a) L0,4 (b) L1,4 (c) L2,4
Fig. 3. Illustration of L0,4, L1,4 and L2,4 in the repair diagram for n = 5.
Si→B := (Si→j : j ∈ B) ,
i ∈ [1 : n], B ⊆ [1 : n] \ {i} (22)
SB→j := (Si→j : i ∈ B) ,
j ∈ [1 : n], B ⊆ [1 : n] \ {j} (23)
S→j := S[1:j−1]∪[j+1:n]→j , j ∈ [1 : n] (24)
S→B := (S→j : j ∈ B) , B ⊆ [1 : n] (25)
S→j := S[1:j−1]→j , j ∈ [1 : n] (26)
S→B := (S→j : j ∈ B), B ⊆ [1 : n] (27)
S→j := S[j+1:n]→j , j ∈ [1 : n] (28)
S→B := (S→j : j ∈ B), B ⊆ [1 : n] (29)
Lt,s := (W[1:t],S→[t+1:s]),
s ∈ [1 : n], t ∈ [0 : s]. (30)
In particular, the collection Lt,s defined in (30) was first
identified in [17] for proving that separate encoding can
achieve the MBR point for multilevel diversity coding
with regeneration. As we shall see, here it also plays a
key role in our proof of (9) and (10). Fig. 3 illustrates
the structure of L0,4, L1,4 and L2,4 in the repair diagram
introduced by Duursma [11] for n = 5.
An important part of the proof is to understand the relations
between the collections of random variables defined above, and
to use them to derive the desired converse results. We have
the following key lemmas, whose proof can be found in the
Appendix.
Lemma 1. For any (n = d + 1, k, d,N,K, T, S)
code that satisfies the node-regeneration requirement (3),
(S→[t+1:s],W[t+1:s]) is a function of Lt,s for any s ∈ [1 : n]
and t ∈ [0 : s− 1].
Lemma 2. For any symmetrical (n = d+ 1, k, d,N,K, T, S)
code, we have
H(S1→[2:p+1]) +H(Lt,r,S[r+2:r+q+1]→r+1)
≥ H(S1→[2:p]) +H(Lt,r,S[r+2:r+q+2]→r+1) (31)
for any t ∈ [1 : 2], r ∈ [2 : k − 1], p ∈ [1 : r − t + 1], and
q ∈ [0 : d− r − 1]. It follows that
H(Lt,j) + Tk,d,jm
−1H(S1→[2:m+1]) ≥ H(Lt,k) (32)
for any t ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [2 : k], and m ∈ [1 : j − t+ 1].
Lemma 3. For any symmetrical (n = d+ 1, k, d,N,K, T, S)
code that satisfies the node-regeneration requirement (3), we
have
d− t
n− jH(L1,j ,Sj→1) +H(L1,t)
≥ d− t
n− jH(L1,j−1,Sj→1) +H(L1,t+1) (33)
for any j ∈ [2 : k − 1] and t ∈ [j : k − 1]. It follows that
H(L1,j ,Sj→1) + (n− j)T−1k,d,mH(L1,m)
≥ H(L1,j−1,Sj→1) + (n− j)T−1k,d,mH(L1,k) (34)
for any j ∈ [2 : k − 1] and m ∈ [j : k − 1].
The inequality (9) can now be proved as follows:
B = H(M)
(a)
= H(M|S→[1:`])
(b)
= H(M|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
≤ H(M,S→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
= H(M|S→[1:`],W[1:`],S→[`+1:k])
+H(S¯→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
= H(M|S→[1:`], L`,k) +H(S¯→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
(c)
= H(M|S→[1:`], L`,k,W[`+1:k])
+H(S¯→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
= H(M|S→[1:`],S→[`+1:k],W[1:k])
+H(S¯→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
(d)
= H(S¯→[`+1:k]|S→[1:`],W[1:`])
≤ H(S¯→[`+1:k])
(d)
≤ Tk,d,lβ
where (a) follows from the repair-secrecy constraint (4); (b)
follows from the fact that W[1:`] is a function of S→[1:`] due to
the node-regeneration constraint (3); (c) follows from the fact
that W[`+1:k]) is a function of L`,k by Lemma 1; (d) follows
from the fact that H(M|S→[1:`],S→[`+1:k],W[1:k]) = 0 due
to the message-recovery constraint (2); and (e) follows from
the bandwidth constraint on the repair messages. Normalizing
both sides by B completes the proof of (9).
6To prove the inequality (10), we shall consider the cases
where Tk,d,` ≤ d and d ≤ Tk,d,` ≤ d+
√
d` separately.
Case 1: Tk,d,` ≤ d. In this case, we have
Tk,d,`α+ dH(S→[1:`])
= Tk,d,`
(
α+H(S→[1:`])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)H(S→[1:`])
(a)
= Tk,d,`
(
α+H(S→[2:`+1]
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)H(S→[1:`])
(b)
≥ Tk,d,`
(
H(W1) +H(S→[2:`+1])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)H(S→[1:`])
(c)
= Tk,d,`
(
H(W1,S1→[2:`+1]) +H(S→[2:`+1])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)H(S→[1:`])
(d)
≥ Tk,d,`
(
H(W1,S→[2:`+1]) +H(S1→[2:`+1])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)H(S→[1:`])
(e)
= Tk,d,`
(
H(W1,S→[2:`+1]) + Tk,d,`+1`−1H(S1→[2:`+1])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)
(
H(S→[1:`]) + Tk,d,``−1H(S1→[2:`+1])
)
(f)
≥ Tk,d,`
(
H(L1,`+1) + Tk,d,`+1`
−1H(S1→[2:`+1])
)
+ (d− Tk,d,`)
(
H(L1,`) + Tk,d,``
−1H(S1→[2:`+1])
)
(35)
where (a) follows from the fact that
H(S→[1:`]) = H(S→[2:`+1]) (36)
due to the symmetrical code that we consider; (b) is due to
the storage-capacity constraint H(W1) ≤ α; (c) is due to the
fact that S1→[2:`+1] is a function of W1; (d) follows from the
fact that
H(W1,S1→[2:`+1]) +H(S→[2:`+1])
≥ H(W1,S→[2:`+1]) +H(S1→[2:`+1]) (37)
due to the submodularity of the entropy function; (e) follows
from the fact that
Tk,d,`+1`
−1 + (d− Tk,d,`) `−1 = 1;
and (f) follows from the facts that
H(W1,S→[2:`+1]) ≥ H(W1,S→[2:`+1]) = H(L1,`+1) (38)
H(S→[1:`]) = H(W1,S→[1:`])
≥ H(W1,S→[2:`]) = H(L1,`). (39)
Applying (32) with (t, j,m) = (1, `+ 1, `) and (t, j,m) =
(1, `, `), respectively gives:
H(L1,`+1) + Tk,d,`+1`
−1H(S1→[2:`+1]) ≥ H(L1,k) (40)
H(L1,`) + Tk,d,`+1`
−1H(S1→[2:`+1]) ≥ H(L1,k). (41)
Substituting (40) and (41) into (35) gives:
Tk,d,`α+ dH(S→[1:`]) ≥ dH(L1,k)
(a)
= dH(L1,k,W[2:k],S→[2:k]) = dH(W[1:k],S→[2:k])
(b)
= dH(W[1:k],M,S→[2:k]) ≥ dH(M,S→[2:`+1])
= dH(S→[2:`+1]) + dH(M|S→[2:`+1])
(c)
= dH(S→[2:`+1]) + dH(M)
(d)
= dH(S→[1:`]) + dB
where (a) follows from the fact that (W[2:k],S→[2:k]) is a
function of L1,k by Lemma 1; (b) follows from the fact that M
is a function of W[1:k] due to the message-recover constraint
(2); (c) follows from the repair-secrecy constraint (4); and
(d) follows again from (36) due to the symmetrical code that
we consider. Canceling dH(S→[1:`]) from both sides of the
inequality completes the proof of (10) for the cases where
Tk,d,` ≤ d.
Case 2: d ≤ Tk,d,` ≤ d+
√
d`. Note that if k = `+ 1, we
have Tk,d,` = d− ` < d. Therefore, in this case we must have
k ≥ `+ 2 ≥ 3. In addition, let
q := 1 + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1
and we have
d− (Tk,d,` − d) q
= T−1k,d,`+1
(−T 2k,d,` + 2dTk,d,` − d(d− `)) ≥ 0.
It follows that
Tk,d,`α+ dH(S→[1:`])
= d
(
α+H(S→[1:`])
)
+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
(a)
= d
(
α+H(S→[2:`+1])
)
+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
(b)
≥ d (H(W1) +H(S→[2:`+1]))+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
(c)
= d
(
H(W1,S1→[2:`+1]) +H(S→[2:`+1])
)
+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
(d)
≥ d (H(W1,S→[2:`+1]) +H(S1→[2:`+1]))+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
(e)
≥ d (H(L1,`+1) +H(S1→[2:`+1]))+ (Tk,d,` − d)α
= (d− (Tk,d,` − d) q)H(L1,`+1)
+ (Tk,d,` − d) (qH(L1,`+1) + α) + dH(S1→[2:`+1])
(42)
where (a) follows from (36) due to the symmetrical code
that we consider; (b) is due to the storage-capacity constraint
H(W1) ≤ α; (c) is due to the fact that S1→[2:`+1] is a function
of W1; (d) follows from (37) due to the submodularity of the
entropy function; and (e) follows from (38).
The first term on the right-hand side of (42) can be further
bounded from below by the fact that L2,`+1 is a function of
L1,`+1 by Lemma 1, so we have
H(L1,`+1) ≥ H(L2,`+1). (43)
To bound from below the second term on the right-hand side
of (42), note that
qH(L1,`+1) + α
= H(L1,`+1) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,`+1) + α
(a)
= H(L1,`+1,S`+1→1) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,`+1) + α
(b)
≥ H(L1,`,S`+1→1) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,k) + α
(c)
≥ H(L1,`,S`+1→1) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,k) +H(W`+1)
(d)
= H(L1,`,S`+1→1) +H(W`+1,S`+1→[1:`])+
(d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,k)
7(e)
≥ H(L1,`,W`+1,S`+1→1) +H(S`+1→[1:`])+
(d− `)T−1d,`+1,kH(L1,k)
(f)
= H(L1,`,W`+1) +H(S`+1→[1:`]) + (d− l)T−1k,d,l+1H(L1,k)
(g)
= H(L2,`+1) +H(S1→[2:`+1]) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L1,k)
(h)
≥ H(L2,`+1) +H(S1→[2:`+1]) + (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L2,k)
(44)
where (a) follows from the fact that S`+1→1 is a function of
W`+1, which is in turn a function of L1,`+1 by Lemma 1; (b)
follows from (34) with (j,m) = (`+1, `+1); (c) is due to the
storage-capacity constraint H(W`+1) ≤ α; (d) follows from
the fact that S`+1→1 is a function of W`+1; (e) follows from
the fact that
H(L1,`,S`+1→1) +H(W`+1,S`+1→[1:`])
≥ H(L1,`,W`+1,S`+1→1) +H(S`+1→[1:`]) (45)
due to the submodularity of the entropy function; (f) follows
yet again from the fact that S`+1→1 is a function of W`+1;
(g) follows from the facts that
H(L1,`,W`+1) = H(L2,`+1) (46)
H(S`+1→[1:`]) = H(S1→[2:`+1]) (47)
due to the symmetrical code that we consider; and (h) follows
from the fact that L2,k is a function of L1,k by Lemma 1, so
we have
H(L1,k) ≥ H(L2,k). (48)
Substituting (43) and (44) into (42) gives:
Tk,d,`α+ dH(S→[1:`])
≥
(
d− (Tk,d,` − d)(d− `)T−1k,d,`+1
)
H(L2,`+1)+
Tk,d,`H(S1→[2:`+1]) + (Tk,d,` − d) (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L2,k)
(a)
= Tk,d,`T
−1
k,d,`+1`
(
H(L2,`+1) + Tk,d,`+1`
−1H(S1→[2:`+1]
)
+
(Tk,d,` − d) (d− `)T−1k,d,`+1H(L2,k)
(b)
≥
(
Tk,d,`T
−1
k,d,`+1`+ (Tk,d,` − d)(d− `)T−1k,d,`+1
)
H(L2,k)
(c)
= dH(L2,k)
(d)
= dH(L2,k,W[3:k],S→[3:k])
= dH(W[1:k],S→[3:k])
(e)
= dH(W[1:k],M,S→[3:k])
≥ dH(M,S→[3:`+2]) = dH(S→[3:`+2]) + dH(M|S→[3:`+2])
(f)
= dH(S→[3:`+2]) + dH(M)
(g)
= dH(S→[1:`]) + dB
where (a) and (c) follow from the fact that
d− (Tk,d,` − d)(d− `)T−1k,d,`+1 = Tk,d,`T−1k,d,`+1`;
(b) follows from (32) with (t, j,m) = (2, `+1, l); (d) follows
from the fact that (W[3:k],S→[3:k]) is a function of L2,k by
Lemma 1; (e) follows from the fact that M is a function of
W[1:k] due to the message-recover constraint (2); (f) is due to
the secrecy constraint (4); and (g) follows from the fact that
H(S→[3:`+2]) = H(S→[1:`]) (49)
due to the symmetrical code that we consider. Canceling
dH(S→[1:`]) from both sides of the inequality completes the
proof of (10) for d ≤ Tk,d,` ≤ d+
√
d`.
B. Proof of (14)
Assume that k = d = n− 1 and ` = 1. As before, we shall
also assume without loss of generality that the codes that we
consider here are symmetrical ones.
Let us first show that for any i ∈ [1 : n− 1], we have
H(S→1) ≥ H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→i) (50)
which can be seen as follows:
H(W[1:i−1]) +H(S→1)
(a)
= H(W[1:i−1]) +H(S→i)
(b)
= H(W[1:i−1],S→i) +H(S→i,S→i)
(c)
≥ H(W[1:i−1],S→i,S→i) +H(S→i)
≥ H(W[1:i−1],S→i) +H(S→i)
≥ H(W[1:i−1]) +H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→i)
where (a) follows from the fact that H(S→1) = H(S→i) due
to the symmetrical code that we consider; (b) is due to the
fact that S→i is a function of W[1:i−1]; and (c) is due to the
submodularity of the entropy function. Canceling H(W[1:i−1])
from both sides completes the proof of (50).
Setting i = 2, 3 in (50) and by the symmetrical code that
we consider, we have
H(S→1) ≥ H(S→2|W1) +H(S→2)
= H(S→2|W1) +H(S1→2)
= H(S→2|W1) +H(Sn→n−1)
= H(S→2|W1) +H(S→n−1)
≥ H(S→2|W1) +H(S→n−1|W[1:n−2]) (51)
and
H(S→1) ≥ H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→3)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S[1:2]→3)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S[n−1:n]→n−2)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→n−2)
≥ H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→n−2|W[1:n−3]). (52)
Adding (51) and (52) gives:
3H(S→1)
≥ H(S→1) +H(S→2|W1) +H(S→3|W[1:2])+
H(S→n−2|W[1:n−3]) +H(S→n−1|W[1:n−2]). (53)
Furthermore, by the repair-bandwidth constraint, we have
(n− 1)(n− 6)
2
β =
n−4∑
i=3
iβ ≥
n−4∑
i=3
H(S→n−i)
≥
n−4∑
i=3
H(S→n−i|W[1:n−i−1]). (54)
8Adding (53) and (54) gives:
(n− 1)(n− 6)
2
β + 3H(S→1)
≥
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→n−i|W[1:n−i−1]) =
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) (55)
where the last equality follows from the change of variable
i→ n− i.
To proceed, we shall need the following lemma, whose
proof can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 4. For any symmetrical (n, k = n − 1, d = n −
1, N,K, T, S) code that satisfies the node-regeneration re-
quirement (3) and the repair-secrecy constraint (4) with ` = 1,
we have
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) + nα ≥ 3H(S→1) + 3B. (56)
Adding (55) and (56) gives:
(n− 1)(n− 6)
2
β + nα+ 3H(S→1) ≥ 3H(S→1) + 3B.
Canceling 3H(S→1) from both sides and normalizing the
remaining terms by B complete the proof of (14).
C. Proof of (15)
Let us first show that
3H(S→1) ≥
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→4) (57)
which can be seen as follows.
First note that
H(S→1)
(a)
≥ H(S→2|W1) +H(S1→2)
(b)
= H(S→2|W1) +H(S7→6)
= H(S→2|W1) +H(S→6)
≥ H(S→2|W1) +H(S→6|W[1:5]) (58)
where (a) follows from (50) with n = 7 and i = 2; and (b)
follows from the fact that H(S1→2) = H(S7→6) due to the
symmetrical code that we consider. Next, we have
H(S→1)
(a)
≥ H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→3)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S[1:2]→3)
(b)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S[6:7]→5)
= H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→5)
≥ H(S→3|W[1:2]) +H(S→5|W[1:4]) (59)
where (a) follows from (50) with n = 7 and i = 3; and (b)
follows from the fact that H(S[1:2]→3) = H(S[6:7]→5) due to
the symmetrical code that we consider. Finally, setting n = 7
and i = 4 in (50) gives
H(S→1) ≥ H(S→4|W[1:3]) +H(S→4). (60)
Adding (58)–(60) completes the proof of (57).
To proceed, we shall consider the cases where α ≥
H(S[2:4]→1) and α ≤ H(S[2:4]→1), separately.
Case 1: α ≥ H(S[2:4]→1). In this case, we have
8α+ 3H(S→1)
≥ 7α+ 3H(S→1) +H(S[2:4]→1)
(a)
≥ 7α+
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→4) +H(S[2:4]→1)
= 7α+
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S[1:3]→4) +H(S[2:4]→1)
(b)
= 7α+
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S[5:7]→1) +H(S[2:4]→1)
≥ 7α+
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→1)
= 7α+
6∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1])
(c)
≥ 3H(S→1) + 3B
where (a) follows from (57); (b) follows from the fact that
H(S[1:3]→4) = H(S[5:7]→1) due to the symmetrical code that
we consider; and (c) follows from Lemma 4 with n = 7.
Canceling 3H(S→1) from both sides and normalizing the
remaining terms by B complete the proof of (15) for the cases
where α ≥ H(S[2:4]→1).
Case 2: α ≤ H(S[2:4]→1). Note that in this case, by node-
capacity constraint and the symmetry of the code that we
consider, we have
H(W1) ≤ α ≤ H(S[2:4]→1) = H(S[1:3]→4) = H(S→4).
(61)
It follows that
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→4)−H(W[1:6])
=
6∑
i=2
(
H(S→i|W[1:i−1])−H(Wi|W[1:i−1])
)
+ (H(S→4)−H(W1))
(a)
≥
6∑
i=2
(
H(S→i|W[1:i−1])−H(Wi|W[1:i−1])
)
(b)
=
6∑
i=2
(
H(S→i,Wi|W[1:i−1])−H(Wi|W[1:i−1])
)
=
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i])
≥
5∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i])
=
5∑
i=2
H(S[i+1:7]→i|W[1:i])
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5∑
i=2
H(S[i+1:6]→i|W[1:i])
=
5∑
i=2
6∑
j=i+1
H(Sj→i|W[1:i],S[i+1:j−1]→i)
(c)
≥
5∑
i=2
6∑
j=i+1
H(Sj→i|W[1:j−1])
=
6∑
j=3
j−1∑
i=2
H(Sj→i|W[1:j−1])
≥
6∑
j=3
H(Sj→[2:j−1]|W[1:j−1])
=
6∑
j=3
H(Sj→[2:j−1])−
6∑
j=3
I(Sj→[2:j−1];W[1:j−1])
(d)
≥
6∑
j=3
H(Sj→[2:j−1])−
6∑
j=3
I(Wj ;W[1:j−1]) (62)
where (a) follows from (61); (b) follows from the fact that
Wi is a function of (S→i,W[1:i−1]) = Li−1,i by Lemma 1;
(c) follows from the fact that S[i+1:j−1]→i is a function of
W[1:j−1]; and (d) follows from the fact that Sj→[2:j−1] is a
function of Wj . Further note that
6∑
j=3
H(Sj→[2:j−1]) + 2α
(a)
=
6∑
j=3
H(Sj+1→[3:j]) + 2α
=
7∑
j=4
H(Sj→[3:j−1]) + 2α ≥ H(S→[3:6]) + 2α
(b)
≥ H(S→[3:6]) +H(W1) +H(W2)
≥ H(S→[3:6],W[1:2]) = H(L2,6) (63)
where (a) follows from the fact that H(Sj→[2:j−1]) =
H(Sj+1→[3:j]) due to the symmetrical code that we consider;
and (b) is due to the node-capacity constraint. We thus have
8α+ 3H(S→1)
(a)
≥ 8α+
6∑
i=2
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(S→4)
(b)
≥ 8α+
6∑
j=3
H(Sj→[2:j−1]) +H(W[1:6])−
6∑
j=3
I(Wj ;W[1:j−1])
(c)
≥ 6α+H(L2,6) +H(W[1:6])−
6∑
j=3
I(Wj ;W[1:j−1])
(d)
≥
6∑
j=1
H(Wj) +H(L2,6) +H(W[1:6])−
6∑
j=3
I(Wj ;W[1:j−1])
=
6∑
j=2
I(Wj ;W[1:j−1]) +H(L2,6) + 2H(W[1:6])
−
6∑
j=3
I(Wj ;W[1:j−1])
= I(W1;W2) +H(L2,6) + 2H(W[1:6])
≥ H(L2,6) + 2H(W[1:6])
(e)
≥ 3H(W[1:6]) (f)= 3H(W[1:7],M)
(g)
= 3H(W[1:7],M,S→1) ≥ 3H(M,S→1)
= 3H(S→1) + 3H(M|S→1) (h)= 3H(S→1) + 3H(M)
= 3H(S→1) + 3B
where (a) follows from (57); (b) follows from (62); (c) follows
from (63); (d) follows from the node-capacity constraint;
(e) follows from the fact that H(L2,6) ≥ H(W[1:6]) due to
Lemma 1; (f) follows from the facts that M is a function of
W[1:6] due to the message-recovery requirement (2) and that
W7 is a function of S→7, which is in turn a function of W[1:6];
(g) follows from the fact that S→1 is a function of W[2:7];
and (h) follows from the repair-secrecy constraint (4) with
` = 1. Canceling 3H(S→1) from both sides and normalizing
the remaining terms by B complete the proof of (15) for the
cases where α ≥ H(S[2:4]→1).
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we considered the (n, k, d, `) secure exact-
repair regenerating code problem, which has been previously
studied in [12]–[15]. We proved that when the secrecy param-
eter ` is sufficiently large, the SRK point [13] is the only
corner point of the achievable normalized storage-capacity
repair-bandwidth tradeoff region. This includes all previous
results from [14] and [15] as special cases. On the other
hand, when ` is small, we showed that it is entirely pos-
sible that the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-
bandwidth tradeoff region features multiple corner points. In
particular, we showed that the achievable normalized storage-
capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region for the (7, 6, 6, 1)
problem has exactly two corner points. This suggests a much
“smoother” transition, in terms of the rate region, from the
original exact-repair regenerating code problem to the secrecy
extension than that suggested by the previous results from [14]
and [15].
The question whether (8) is also necessary for the SRK
point [13] to be the only corner point of the achievable
normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region
remains open. Significant research is also needed to further
understand how the tradeoff region Rn,k,d,` may look like
when ` is small (the non-secrecy case with ` = 0 remains
open and appears to be very challenging).
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THE TECHNICAL LEMMAS
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix s ∈ [1 : n] and t ∈ [0 : s − 1]. Let
us first note that S→t+1 is a function of W[1:t]. As a result,
S→t+1 = (S→t+1,S→t+1) is a function of Lt,s. It thus follows
10
immediately from the node-regeneration requirement (3) that
Wt+1 is a function of Lt,s. Similarly and inductively, it can be
shown that (S→j ,Wj) is a function of Lt,s for all j ∈ [t+2 : s]
as well. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove (31), let us fix t ∈ [1 : 2],
r ∈ [2 : k− 1], p ∈ [1 : r− t+ 1], and q ∈ [0 : d− r− 1]. We
have
H(S1→[2:p+1]) +H(Lt,r,S[r+2:r+q+1]→r+1)
(a)
= H(Sr+q+2→[r−p+2:r+1]) +H(Lt,r,S[r+2:r+q+1]→r+1)
(b)
≥ H(Sr+q+2→[r−p+2:r]) +H(Lt,r,S[r+2:r+q+2]→r+1)
(c)
= H(S1→[2:p]) +H(Lt,r,S[r+2:r+q+2]→r+1)
where (a) follows from the fact that H(S1→[2:p+1]) =
H(Sr+q+2→[r−p+2:r+1]) due to the symmetrical codes that
we consider; (b) follows from the submodularity of the
entropy function; and (c) follows from the fact that
H(Sr+q+2→[r−p+2:r]) = H(S1→[2:p]) again due to the sym-
metrical codes that we consider. This completes the proof
of (31) for any r ∈ [2 : k − 1], p ∈ [1 : r − t + 1], and
q ∈ [0 : d− r − 1].
To prove (32), let us fix t ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [2 : k], and
m ∈ [1 : j − t + 1]. Notice that (32) holds trivially with
equality when j = k, so we only need to consider the cases
where j ∈ [2 : k − 1] for k ≥ 3. (When k = 2, [2 : k − 1]
is empty and there is nothing to prove.) Now adding (31) for
q ∈ [0 : d− r − 1] gives:
(d− r)H(S1→[2:p+1]) +
d−r−1∑
q=0
H(Lt,r,S[r+2:r+q+1]→r+1)
≥ (d− r)H(S1→[2:p]) +
d−r−1∑
q=0
H(Lt,r,S[r+2:r+q+2]→r+1).
Canceling
∑d−r−1
q=1 H(Lt,r,S[r+2:r+q+1]→r+1) from both
sides of the above inequality gives:
(d− r)H(S1→[2:p+1]) +H(Lt,r)
≥ (d− r)H(S1→[2:p]) +H(Lt,r,S[r+2:n]→r+1)
= (d− r)H(S1→[2:p]) +H(Lt,r+1) (64)
for any r ∈ [2 : k − 1] and p ∈ [1 : r − t + 1]. Adding (64)
for r ∈ [j : k − 1] and p ∈ [1 : m] gives:
Tk,d,j
m∑
p=1
H(S1→[2:p+1]) +m
k−1∑
r=j
H(Lt,r)
≥ Tk,d,j
m∑
p=1
H(S1→[2:p]) +m
k−1∑
r=j
H(Lt,r+1).
Canceling Tk,d,j
∑m
p=2H(S1→[2:p]) + m
∑k−1
r=j+1H(Lt,r)
from both sides of the above inequality gives:
Tk,d,jH(S1→[2:m+1]) +mH(Lt,j) ≥ mH(Lt,k).
Dividing both sides by m completes the proof of (32) for any
t ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [2 : k], and m ∈ [1 : j− t+ 1]. This completes
the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. To prove (33), let us fix j ∈ [2 : k − 1]
and t ∈ [j : k−1]. Let n− j = u(d− t) +p for some positive
integers u and p ∈ [1 : d− t]. Let
τ0 := {1} ∪ [j + 1 : j + p− 1] (65)
and
τq := [j + p+ (q − 1)(d− t) : j + p+ q(d− t)− 1] (66)
for q ∈ [1 : u− 1]. Notice that we have
∪u−1q=0 τq = {1} ∪ [j + 1 : t]. (67)
By the symmetry of the codes that we consider, we have
H(Sτ0→t+1|W2,S→[3:j],St+1,2)
= H(SB→t+1|W2,S→[3:j],St+1,2) (68)
for any B ⊆ [t + 2 : n] such that |B| = |τ0| = p. It follows
that
H(Sτ0→t+1|W2,S→[3:j],St+1→2)
(a)
≥ p
d− tH(S[t+2:n]→t+1|W2,S→[3:j],St+1→2)
=
p
d− tH(S[t+2:n]→t+1|W2,S→[3:j],S→[3:j],St+1→2)
(b)
≥ p
d− tH(S[t+2:n]→t+1|W2,S→[3:j], L1,t)
(c)
=
p
d− tH(S[t+2:n]→t+1|L1,t)
=
p
d− t
(
H(S[t+2:n]→t+1, L1,t)−H(L1,t)
)
=
p
d− t (H(L1,t+1)−H(L1,t)) (69)
where (a) follows from the well-known Han’s inequality
[18]; (b) follows from the facts that (S→[3:j],St+1→2) is a
sub-collection of random variables from L1,t and that condi-
tioning reduces entropy; and (c) follows from the fact that
(W2,S→[3:j]) is a function of L1,t by Lemma 1.
Next, let us show, by induction, that
rH(L1,t) +H(L1,j ,Sj→1)
≥ rH(L1,t+1) +H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1,St+1→2)
(70)
for any r ∈ [1 : u].
For the base case where r = 1, we have
H(L1,t) +H(L1,j ,Sj→1)
(a)
= H(L1,t,W2,S→[2:j],S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1) +H(L1,j ,Sj→1)
(b)
= H(L1,t,W2,S→[2:j],S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(L1,j ,S→[2:j−1],Sj→1)
= H(W[1:2],S→[2:j],S→[j+1:t],S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(W1,S→[2:j−1],S→j ,Sj→1)
(c)
= H(W[1:2],S→[2:j],S→[j+1:t],S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1,S→t+1,St+1→2)
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(d)
≥ H(W[1:2],S→[2:j],S→[j+1:t+1],S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1,St+1→2)
= H(L1,t+1,W2,S→[2:j],S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1,St+1→2)
(e)
= H(L1,t+1) +H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1,St+1→2)
where (a) and (e) follow from the fact that
(W2,S→[2:j],S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1) is a function of L1,t by Lemma 1;
(b) follows from the fact that S→[2:j] is a function of L1,j by
Lemma 1; and (c) follows from the fact that
H(W1,S→[2:j−1],S→j ,Sj→1)
= H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−1q=0 τq→t+1,S→t+1,St+1→2) (71)
due to the symmetrical codes that we consider; and (d)
follows from the submodularity of the entropy function. This
completes the proof of the base case.
Now assume that (70) holds for some r ∈ [1 : u−1]. Similar
to the base case, we have
H(L1,t) +H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1,St+1→2)
(a)
= H(L1,t,W2,S→[2:j],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
)
+H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1,St+1→2)
= H(W[1:2],S→[2:j],S→[j+1:t],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
)
+H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1,St+1→2)
(b)
= H(W[1:2],S→[2:j],S→[j+1:t],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
)
+H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
,S→t+1,St+1→2)
(c)
≥ H(W[1:2],S→[2:j],S→[j+1:t+1],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1)
+H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
,St+1→2)
= H(L1,t+1,W2,S→[2:j],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
)
+H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
,St+1→2)
(d)
= H(L1,t+1) +H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
,St+1→2)
(72)
where (a) and (d) follow from the fact that
(W2,S→[2:j],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
) is a function of L1,t+1
by Lemma 1; (b) follows from the fact that
H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−rq=0 τq→t+1,St+1→2)
= H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
,S→t+1,St+1→2) (73)
due to the symmetrical codes that we consider; and (c) follows
from the submodularity of the entropy function. Adding (70)
and (72) gives
(r+1)H(L1,t) +H(L1,j ,Sj→1)
≥ (r + 1)H(L1,t+1)
+H(W2,S→[3:j],S∪u−(r+1)q=0 τq→t+1
,St+1→2).
This completes the proof of the induction step.
Finally, setting r = u in (70) gives:
uH(L1,t) +H(L1,j ,Sj→1)
≥ uH(L1,t+1) +H(W2,S→[3:j],Sτ0→t+1,St+1→2)
= uH(L1,t+1) +H(W2,S→[3:j],St+1→2)
+H(Sτ0→t+1|W2,S→[3:j],St+1→2). (74)
Substituting (69) into (74) and using the fact that
u+
p
d− t =
u(d− t) + p
d− t =
n− j
d− t (75)
we have
n− j
d− t H(L1,t) +H(L1,j ,Sj→1)
≥ n− j
d− t H(L1,t+1) +H(W2,S→[3:j],St+1→2). (76)
Finally, due to the symmetrical codes that we consider, we
have
H(W2,S→[3:j],St+1→2)
= H(W1,S→[2:j−1],Sj→1)
= H(W1,S→[2:j−1],S→[2:j−1],Sj→1)
= H(L1,j−1,S→[2:j−1],Sj→1)
= H(L1,j−1,Sj→1) (77)
where the last equality follows from the fact that S→[2:j−1]
is a function of L1,j−1 by Lemma 1. Substituting (77) into
(76) completes the proof of (33) for any j ∈ [2 : k − 1] and
t ∈ [j : k − 1].
Proof of Lemma 4. First note that
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1])
(a)
=
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i,Wi|W[1:i−1])
=
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i]) +
n−1∑
i=1
H(Wi|W[1:i−1])
=
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i]) +H(W[1:n−1])
=
n−1∑
i=1
H(S[i+1:n]→i|W[1:i]) +H(W[1:n−1])
=
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
H(Sj→i|W[1:i],S[i+1;j−1]→i) +H(W[1:n−1])
(b)
≥
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
H(Sj→i|W[1:j−1]) +H(W[1:n−1])
=
n∑
j=2
j−1∑
i=1
H(Sj→i|W[1:j−1]) +H(W[1:n−1])
≥
n−1∑
j=2
j−1∑
i=1
H(Sj→i|W[1:j−1]) +H(W[1:n−1])
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≥
n−1∑
j=2
H(Sj→[1:j−1]|W[1:j−1]) +H(W[1:n−1])
=
n−1∑
j=2
H(Sj→[1:j−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
I(Sj→[1:j−1];W[1:j−1])
+H(W[1:n−1])
(c)
=
n−1∑
j=2
H(Sj+1→[2:j])−
n−1∑
j=1
I(Sj→[1:j−1];W[1:j−1])
+H(W[1:n−1])
≥ H(S→[2:n−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
I(Sj→[1:j−1];W[1:j−1])
+H(W[1:n−1]) (78)
where (a) follows from the fact that Wi is a function of
(W[1:i−1],S→i) = Li−1,i by Lemma 1; (b) follows from the
fact that S[i+1;j−1]→i is a function of W[1:j−1]; and (c) follows
from the fact that H(Sj→[1:j−1]) = H(Sj+1→[2:j]) due to the
symmetrical code that we consider.
Further note that
H(S→[2:n−1]) +H(W1)
≥ H(W1,S→[2:n−1]) = H(L1,n−1). (79)
Adding (78)–(79) gives:
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) +H(W1)
≥ H(L1,n−1) +H(W[1:n−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
I(Sj→[1:j−1];W[1:j−1])
(a)
≥ H(L1,n−1) +H(W[1:n−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
I(Wj ;W[1:j−1])
= H(L1,n−1) +H(W[1:n−1])
−
n−1∑
j=1
(
H(Wj) +H(W[1:j−1])−H(W[1:j])
)
= H(L1,n−1) + 2H(W[1:n−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
H(Wj)
(b)
≥ 3H(W[1:n−1])−
n−1∑
j=1
H(Wj) (80)
where (a) follows from the fact that Sj→[1:j−1] is a function of
Wj ; and (b) follows from the fact that W[2:n−1] is a function of
L1,n−1 by Lemma 1 so we have H(L1,n−1) ≥ H(W[1:n−1]).
Finally, by the node-capacity constraint, we have
nα ≥ H(W1) +
n−1∑
j=1
H(Wj). (81)
Adding (80) and (81) gives:
n−1∑
i=1
H(S→i|W[1:i−1]) + nα
≥ 3H(W[1:n−1]) (a)= 3H(W[1:n],M) (b)= 3H(W[1:n],M,S→1)
≥ 3H(M,S→1) = 3H(S→1) + 3H(M|S→1)
(c)
= 3H(S→1) + 3H(M) = 3H(S→1) + 3B
where (a) follows from the facts that M is a function of
W[1:n−1] by the message-recovery requirement (2) and that
Wn is a function of S→n, which is in turn a function of
W[1:n−1]; (b) follows from the fact that S→1 is a function of
W[2:n]; and (c) follows from the repair-secrecy requirement
(4) with ` = 1. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
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